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I. INTRODUCTION
Gerald Shargel, a prominent criminal attorney in New York, has
written, "A trial may be a search for the truth, but I - as a defense
attorney - am not part of the search party."' This essay asks who
is a member of the search party, and by what tactics parties and
lawyers impede a successful search for the truth, both in the court-
room and in the interactions among people that set the stage for
judicial intervention. In this effort, the essay distinguishes among
three kinds of dishonesty: lies, deceit, and bullshit.
The federal perjury statute criminalizes an assertion of a mate-
rial fact that the speaker believes to be false but which is asserted
* Don Forchelli Professor of Law and Director, Center for the Study of Law, Language
and Cognition, Brooklyn Law School. The author expresses his gratitude to Laurence Horn
and Jason Stanley for valuable insights into these issues, and to the participants in the Du-
quesne symposium, of which this article is a part.
1. Gerald L. Shargel, Federal Evidence Rule 608(b): Gateway to the Minefield of Witness
Preparation, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1263 (2007).
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as true.2 Once one has taken an oath to tell the truth, it is a crime
for that person to "willfully and contrary to such oath state[ ] or
subscribe[ ] any material matter which he does not believe to be
true."3 The law purports to disapprove of lying. By and large it
does, but not always. For example, the legal system gives law en-
forcement officers license to lie both during the interrogation of wit-
nesses and during sting operations and subsequently permits pros-
ecutors to take advantage of these lies. 4 The prosecutors them-
selves may not lie, however. Moreover, there is well-studied toler-
ance by judges of police officers lying about the circumstances under
which they seized evidence or interrogated a suspect.5
Apart from such selective tolerance, conceptual questions about
lies arise from time to time. May a witness who intended to lie be
saved from a perjury conviction if the testimony turns out to be true
by some kind of fluke? For example, what if the witness was mis-
taken about the facts and what he intended as a lie was really true?
Another issue is whether the witness must intend that the false
statement be believed. In the film Casablanca, Humphrey Bogart's
character, Rick, is asked his nationality and answers, "I'm a drunk-
ard." 6 Whether that was a lie or not depends upon whether an in-
tention to deceive is part of the definition of lying. In civil litigation,
a plaintiff who claims to have been damaged by having relied on a
false statement must demonstrate that the reliance was reasona-
ble. Whether perjury requires that the speaker could reasonably
expect to be believed is not well-established in the case law, sug-
gesting that there are few, if any, prosecutions that raise the issue.
While lying is about both false testimony and the state of mind of
the speaker, deceit is more about the state of mind of the infor-
mation's recipient. A speaker has deceived another when the
speaker has led the hearer to come to believe something to be true
that the speaker believes to be false. It makes no difference
whether the speaker did this by means of making false assertations
of fact or by uttering half-truths or by other means of persuasion.
Speech act theorists refer to a hearer-oriented element of an act of
speech as the perlocutionary effect of the utterance-the effect it has
on the state of mind of the hearer, rather than the communicative
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2016).
3. Id. (emphasis added).
4. For discussion, see Stuart Green, Lying in Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LYING
(Jorg Meubauer, ed.) (forthcoming) (manuscript at 11-12).
5. Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1037 (1996).
6. Mjcgonzales, Are My Eyes Really Brown?, YOUTUBE (June 5, 2009),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZkM6HegRk3A.
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intent of the speaker.7 Verbs vary as to their focus in this regard.
"Persuade," for example, holds when the perlocutionary effect of an
assertion is to convince the hearer of a proposition.
As for "bullshit," I intend that word to be understood as described
by Harry Frankfurt, in his 2005 book On Bullshit.8 Frankfurt
paints the bullshitter as an amoral person, not concerned about
whether what he says is true or false. Thus, the bullshitter is not a
liar because the liar must say something he believes is false, and
the bullshitter does not bother himself with such concerns.
Whether the bullshitter engages in deceit is a different matter. The
bullshitter may be concerned with the perlocutionary effect of his
or her statements but not with whether the statement is intended
to convince the hearer of something true or false. As Frankfurt puts
it:
The fact about himself that the bullshitter hides . . . is that the
truth-values of his statements are of no central interest to him;
what we are not to understand is that his intention is neither
to report the truth nor to conceal it....
It is impossible for someone to lie unless he thinks he knows
the truth. Producing bullshit requires no such conviction. 9
In a number of circumstances, the law declares bullshit as unac-
ceptable, recognizing that it would not be covered by the ordinary
definitions of deceit or lying. Illustrations include Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that an attorney
(or party) make adequate investigation of the facts underlying a
submission to a federal court or be subject to monetary or other
sanctions.10 Of course, lawyers do sometimes intentionally include
false allegations in a legal pleading. More often, however, a lawyer
may simply intend to fill in the gaps in a narrative in which a num-
ber of the assertions required for the lawyer to succeed can be
proven, but not all such assertions. When a lawyer takes liberties
with these remaining facts, the lawyer is engaged in bullshitting.
The same holds true for fraud under a number of common law and
statutory definitions. Asserting something as true without finding
out whether it is true or not is considered fraudulent behavior.
The remainder of this essay explores the themes raised in this
introduction with examples from legal proceedings, from business
7. J.L. AUSTIN, HOW To Do THINGS WITH WORDS 101 (1962).
8. HARRY G. FRANKFURT, ON BULLSHIT (2005).
9. FRANKFURT, supra note 8, at 55.
10. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
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transactions (real and hypothetical) that may become the subject of
such proceedings, and from political discourse.
II. LYING
Lying is outlawed in one context after another. Lying under oath
is perjury." Lying to a government official is a federal crime. 12 Ly-
ing in a business transaction is a species of fraud if the party lied to
reasonably relies on the lie to his or her detriment.13 Lawyers may
not lie in the course of representing a client.14 Nor may they ar-
range to have a non-lawyer employee lie as their agent.15
A. What is a Lie?
Linguist/philosopher Laurence Horn sets forth four criteria that
have been proposed in defining what constitutes a lie:
(C1) S says/asserts that p
(C2) S believes that p is false
(C3) p is false
(C4) S intends to deceive H16
There is general agreement that a lie must be an assertion of
some kind. An opinion, a question, a promise and other such speech
acts do not have truth value and therefore cannot be false.17 Phi-
losopher Don Fallis elaborates: "I think that you assert something
when (a) you say something and (b) you believe that you are in a
situation where you should not say things that you believe to be
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2016).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2016).
13. A classic example is Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission, which
defines securities fraud. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018). It is fraudulent conduct "[t]o make
any untrue statement of a material fact" in a securities transaction. While lying is sufficient
to constitute fraud, it is not a necessary condition, in that the rule also outlaws other types
of deceptive practice. See infra note 80 for further discussion of this rule.
14. See, e.g., N.Y. RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT r. 4.1 (2017) ("In the course of representing
a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a third per-
son.").
15. See, e.g., N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, r. 5.3(b)(1) (2017) ("A lawyer shall be re-
sponsible for the conduct of a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with the law-
yer that would be a violation of these Rules if engaged in by a lawyer, if: (1) the lawyer orders
or directs the specific conduct or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies it[.]").
16. Laurence Horn, Telling it Slant: Toward a Taxonomy of Deception, in THE
PRAGMATIC TURN IN LAW 23, 24-25 (Janet Giltrow & Dieter Stein eds., 2017).
17. Well, almost. One can lie about what one's opinion is, although as an opinion, its
substance lacks truth value.
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false."18 Fallis, in turn, takes this condition on assertions to follow
from Paul Grice's maxim of quality that we expect of our partners
in conversation: "Do not say what you believe to be false." 19
There is also wide agreement that one does not lie if one says
what one believes to be true but is wrong. Such cases are matters
of mistake. It is the last two criteria that create disagreement and
some confusion. Does a statement have to be false for it to consti-
tute a lie? Most say "no," following the writings of St. Augustine in
late antiquity. 20 If one intends to make a false statement, he is not
rescued by the truth if he happens to have spoken truthfully be-
cause he mistook the facts. If I attempt to protect my friend by
saying he was in Cleveland when a crime was committed although
I am quite certain that he was in Pittsburgh committing the crime,
I have lied even if it turns out that I was wrong and he really was
in Cleveland. As we shall see, the law of perjury follows this tradi-
tion.
Finally, there is a question of whether a lie must be part of an
effort to deceive. Those who argue that this is not required (alt-
hough it is characteristic of most lies) cite examples such as the stu-
dent who lies to the school authorities as not having cheated, know-
ing that they will not believe him, but maintaining the position so
that there will not be adequate proof to justify severe punishment.
No doubt the student lied. Likewise, a witness afraid of repercus-
sions may testify falsely to protect himself, knowing full well that
he will fool no one, having already told authorities the true story
before the trial began. Roy Sorensen refers to such assertions as
bald-faced lies. 21 In keeping with positions taken by Jennifer Saul,
Don Fallis,22 and other philosophers, this essay proceeds on the
claim that an attempt to deceive is a feature of the prototypical lie
but not a necessary condition for an assertion to be deemed a lie. 2 3
18. Don Fallis, What is Lying?, 106 J. PHIL. 29, 33 (2009).
19. Id. (quoting PAUL GRICE, Logic and Conversation, in STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS
22, 27 (1989). Grice also includes a maxim to the effect that one should avoid bullshit in
conversation: "Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence." Id.
20. See generally Saint Augustine, To Consentius, Against Lying, NEW ADVENT,
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1313.htm (last visited May 10, 2018).
21. Roy Sorensen, Bald-Faced Lies! Lying Without the Intent to Deceive, 88 PAC. PHIL. Q.
251 (2007).
22. See Fallis, supra note 18.
23. See Horn, supra note 16 at 26-27; JENNIFER MATHER SAUL, LYING, MISLEADING, AND
WHAT IS SAID 8-12 (2012); see generally Sorensen, supra note 21.
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B. Perjury
As for perjury, the leading case is a 1973 unanimous Supreme
Court decision Bronston v. United States.2 4 Bronston was a film
producer who had filed for bankruptcy. Required to answer ques-
tions under oath from the creditors from whom he sought relief, the
following colloquy took place:
'Q. Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr.
Bronston?
'A. No sir.
'Q. Have you ever?
'A. The company had an account there for about six months,
in Zurich.25
It turned out that not only did the company have an account in Zur-
ich in the past, but so did Bronston himself. As a result, he was
prosecuted for perjury and convicted. The perjury statute states in
relevant part:
Whoever-
(1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, of-
ficer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United
States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will
testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written
testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him
subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath
states or subscribes any material matter which he does not
believe to be true; . . . is guilty of perjury[.] 2 6
But the Supreme Court reversed the conviction, relying on a dis-
tinction between a false statement on the one hand and a true state-
ment leading to a false inference on the other:
The words of the statute confine the offense to the witness who
'willfully ... states ... any material matter which he does not
believe to be true.' Beyond question, petitioner's answer to the
crucial question was not responsive if we assume, as we do,
that the first question was directed at personal bank accounts.
24. 409 U.S. 352 (1973).
25. Id. at 354.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2016).
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There is, indeed, an implication in the answer to the second
question that there was never a personal bank account; in cas-
ual conversation this interpretation might reasonably be
drawn. But we are not dealing with casual conversation and
the statute does not make it a criminal act for a witness to will-
fully state any material matter that implies any material mat-
ter that he does not believe to be true.27
This has come to be known as the "literal truth defense" to per-
jury.28 The Court noted that Bronston's answer was unresponsive,
not false, and that an alert lawyer would be on sufficient notice to
ask a follow-up question, such as, "Mr. Bronston, I didn't ask about
your company; I asked about you." As Peter Tiersma and I have
noted, this holding, at least if taken at face value, sets a very low
moral floor for witnesses who swear to tell the truth in an enterprise
whose goal is to seek out and discover the truth.29
Yet the questions and answers in a courtroom or a deposition are
not ordinary conversational exchanges. The philosopher Paul Grice
famously wrote that conversation is a cooperative enterprise. When
speaking with others, we typically abide by his cooperative princi-
ple, "Make your contribution such as it is required, at the stage at
which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk ex-
change in which you are engaged." 30 In litigation contexts, however,
witnesses are instructed by their lawyers to answer the questions
asked and not to volunteer more information for the sake of being
helpful. This instruction does not entirely flout the cooperative
principle because witnesses must give answers that are both rele-
vant and truthful. Grice lists four maxims as components of coop-
eration in conversation. Two are the maxim of relation (be relevant)
and the maxim of quality (be truthful). 31 Others have elevated rel-
evance to the principal component of conversational responsibil-
ity.32
As for Bronston, the Court held, in essence, that by giving an an-
swer that was literally both truthful and irrelevant, he had flouted
27. 409 U.S. at 357-58.
28. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION,
IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 49 (1999).
29. LAWRENCE M. SOLAN & PETER M. TIERSMA, SPEAKING OF CRIME (2005). I also explore
this issue in Lawrence M. Solan, Lawyers as Insincere (But Truthful) Actors, 36 J. LEGAL
PROF. 487 (2012).
30. H. P. Grice, Logic and Conversation, in 3 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS 41, 45 (Peter Cole
& Jerry L. Morgan eds., 1975).
31. Id. at 46.
32. See DAN SPERBER & DEIRDRE WILSON, RELEVANCE: COMMUNICATION AND COGNITION
(2d ed. 1995).
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the maxim of relation but not the maxim of quality. But that, of
course, is not all that Bronston did. In ordinary discourse, if a per-
son says that his company had a Swiss Bank Account in response
to a question about whether the witness himself had one, the nor-
mal inference is that the witness intends to convey, "No. I never
had one, but. . ." Bronston thus succeeded in misleading the ques-
tioner into concluding that Bronston himself did not have one. If
the questioner thought otherwise, he would indeed have asked the
follow-up question necessary to button down the facts about what
Bronston himself owned.
Without question, Bronston engaged in dishonest conduct. Some
commentators believe that the case was wrongly decided for that
reason. 33 But if perjury is about lying, and the Court decided to
articulate a bright line rule, then at first glance, it seemed to have
accomplished its goal. The Court itself took a second glance, how-
ever, recognizing that whether an answer to a question is truthful
requires not only analysis of the answer, but also analysis of the
question. Because Bronston's response was so blatantly unrespon-
sive, the Court reasoned, it was the questioner who should be held
responsible for the truth not coming out. The Court thus distin-
guished Bronston's conduct from the conduct in a hypothetical case
that the trial court had presented. It concerns the third of Grice's
maxims: the maxim of quantity (say whatever is necessary to make
one's point but not more). 34 The district court, which the Supreme
Court quoted, had noted:
(I)f it is material to ascertain how many times a person has
entered a store on a given day and that person responds to such
a question by saying five times when in fact he knows that he
entered the store 50 times that day, that person may be guilty
of perjury even though it is technically true that he entered the
store five times.35
The Supreme Court argued that the situation was unlike that in
Bronston because "the answer 'five times' is responsive to the hypo-
thetical question, and contains nothing to alert the questioner that
he may be side-tracked." 3 6 The Court continued:
33. See, e.g., Philip Gaines, Toward a Communicative Approach to Law- and Rule-Mak-
ing, in SPEAKING OF LANGUAGE AND LAW: CONVERSATIONS ON THE WORK OF PETER TIERSMA
235 (Lawrence M. Solan, Janet Ainsworth & Roger Shuy, eds. 2015).
34. Grice, supra note 30, at 46-47.
35. Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 355 n.3 (1973).
36. Id.
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Whether an answer is true must be determined with reference
to the question it purports to answer, not in isolation. An unre-
sponsive answer is unique in this respect, because its unre-
sponsiveness by definition prevents its truthfulness from being
tested in the context of the question-unless there is to be spec-
ulation as to what the unresponsive answer 'implies.' 3 7
The Court was correct in declaring that unresponsive answers
may generate false inferences but are not false answers to the ques-
tions in their own right. But the situation is a bit more complex.
Ambiguous questions pose a similar problem. If a question is sub-
ject to more than one interpretation, a witness's answer may be
truthful if the question is understood one way yet false if it is un-
derstood another way. Generally, as the Court assumes, if we ask
someone how many times he or she has been to a particular place,
we mean to ask for the sum total of times. But this is not always
true of quantitative inquiries. Consider this hypothetical: Two
friends are taking a long walk, and one sees a beverage machine at
a gas station that they pass. It requires inserting a $1 bill and some
coins. He has the coins but not the $1 bill. He asks his friend, "How
much cash do you have?" The friend, understanding the situation,
responds, "I have a dollar." In fact, he has $32. Did he lie? No. He
was merely trying to advance the conversation by giving a relevant
response. What he meant was that he had at least the dollar re-
quired for the beverage, and he would be understood that way. By
the same token, if a store has a special promotion for patrons who
had been there at least five times in the past month, a person who
had been there fifty times could enter the store and say forthrightly
that he had been there five times when asked how many times he
had been there.
If what I have said thus far is right, it presents a problem for the
Court's analysis. The Court was correct in its assertion that con-
struing an unresponsive answer as misleading requires it to specu-
late as to the inferences that a reasonable hearer would draw. How-
ever, it is also true that determining whether a seemingly respon-
sive answer is true or false requires a court to speculate as to the
inferences that the witness drew in understanding the question, at
least in the examples that the Supreme Court used. Of course, some
questions are sufficiently clear that this is not a problem. But many
are not, and we routinely resolve ambiguity as we attempt to un-
derstand the discourse.
37. Id.
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If the truth of an answer can be judged only with respect to the
question that was asked, can a witness be saved from a perjury con-
viction if the questioner misstated the question but both questioner
and witness understood the question to mean what the questioner
intended to ask? This inquiry may sound bizarre, but it is exactly
what happened in United States v. DeZarn38-and the answer the
Sixth Circuit gave was "no": If you are under oath, and you answer
a question in a manner that you believe to be false, then you have
committed the crime of perjury even if your answer is literally true.
In 1990, Robert DeZarn, a retired officer in the Kentucky Na-
tional Guard, attended and participated in a fundraising party for
a political candidate running for governor of Kentucky. The party
was held at the home of an officer in the Kentucky National Guard,
General Wellman. The party was referred to as a "Preakness party"
because it was held on the day of the annual Preakness horse race.
It is illegal for officers to solicit such funds from military personnel.
In 1991, that same officer held another, smaller party, this time on
the day of the Kentucky Derby race. DeZarn attended that party
as well. No fundraising took place at the 1991 event.
Because of the illegality of the fundraising by military personnel,
an investigation ensued once authorities heard about the incident.
DeZarn was questioned by an officer, in relevant part, as follows:
Q: Okay, sir. My question is going to deal with General Well-
man, though. Was it traditional for General Wellman to hold
parties at his home and invite Guardsman to attend?
A [by DeZarn]: Well, I suppose you could say that for a number
of years that going back to the late 50s he has done this on
occasion.
Q: Okay. In 1991, and I recognize this is in the period that you
were retired, he [i.e., General Wellman, the host] held the
Preakness Party at his home. Were you aware of that?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you attend?
A: Yes.
38. 157 F.3d 1042 (6th Cir. 1998).
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Q: Okay. Sir, was that a political fundraising activity?
A: Absolutely not.
Q: Okay. Did then Lieutenant Governor Jones, was he in at-
tendance at the party?
A: I knew he was invited. I don't remember if he made an ap-
pearance or not.
Q: All right, sir. You said it was not a political fundraising ac-
tivity. Were there any contributions to Governor Jones' cam-
paign made at that activity?
A: I don't know.
Q: Okay. You did not see any, though?
A: No.
Q: And you were not aware of any?
A: No.39
DeZarn was convicted of perjury for having given these answers.
He appealed on the ground that the questioner placed the party in
1991, and in that year, there was no political fundraising. The jury,
though, believed that DeZarn and the questioner both understood
at the time that they were talking about the 1990 fundraising
Preakness party that had occurred the year before and that he had
therefore testified falsely.
Had the questioner asked DeZarn about a 1991 Kentucky Derby
party, there would have been little justification for the conviction.
The testimony as it did occur, however, presents a thorny doctrinal
question. Why is it that Bronston's answer is not perjurious be-
cause it requires the hearer to draw an inference that Bronston
himself did not have a Swiss Bank Account, but DeZarn's testimony
is perjurious, even though his answer requires the hearer to draw
an inference that the questioner had mistakenly placed the Preak-
ness party in the wrong year? Interestingly, in Bronston, the Court
put the blame on the lawyer for not following up after receiving an
unresponsive answer:
39. Id. at 1044-45.
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It is the responsibility of the lawyer to probe; testimonial inter-
rogation, and cross examination in particular, is a probing, pry-
ing, pressing form of inquiry. If a witness evades, it is the law-
yer's responsibility to recognize the evasion and to bring the
witness back to the mark, to flush out the whole truth with the
tools of adversary examination. 40
In DeZarn, in contrast, the questioner, rather than failing to follow
up with the witness, simply asked the wrong question in the first
place, leaving a degree of ambiguity that the witness attempted to
leverage to create a misleading record. The court reasoned:
At trial, DeZarn testified that Colonel Tripp, by mistakenly set-
ting the questions in his interview about the Preakness Party
in 1991, rather than 1990, led him to answer the questions with
reference to the 1991 dinner party, which was not a fundraiser
and at which he did not collect any contributions.
Evidence was presented at trial, however, to establish that
DeZarn was not misled by the 1991 date but had answered the
investigators' questions as he had with intent to deceive them.
Specifically, all of the individuals questioned by the investiga-
tors described the same party, even though some were ques-
tioned about a "Preakness Party", some were questioned about
a "1990 Preakness Party", and some, like DeZarn, were ques-
tioned about a "1991 Preakness Party". 4 1
Let us assume that the court was accurate in its description of
DeZarn's motives. The question then becomes what difference
should DeZarn's motives make if he arguably did not answer falsely
in light of the questioner's mistake in wording the question? After
all, Bronston had bad motives, too.
The perjury statute, read literally, does not have a literal truth
defense. 42 Bronston did not violate the law if we read the law as
written. He did not say something that he did not believe to be true.
What about DeZarn? If DeZarn believed that the question was ask-
ing about the 1990 Preakness party, then he did violate the law.
But what if he was just being cagey? What if DeZarn saw an open-
ing in the question that permitted him to answer as he did without
actually lying? If so, he did this not because he was trying to be
40. 409 U.S. at 358-59.
41. 157 F.3d at 1046.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2016).
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helpful and forthright, but rather because he wanted to take ad-
vantage of the lawyer's mistake and avoid having to say what really
took place without perjuring himself. If that is what happened, it
is difficult to distinguish the two cases on their relevant facts.
The Supreme Court was certainly correct in concluding that one
cannot assess the truthfulness of an answer without knowing what
the question was. Yet it is not a simple matter to reconcile Bronston
and DeZarn. There was only one Preakness party, and it was an
illegal fundraising event. If DeZarn understood the question as re-
ferring to that party, then he committed perjury. By the same to-
ken, there was only one relevant party in 1991, and it was not a
fundraising party. If DeZarn understood the question as referring
to that party, then he did not commit perjury. The more difficult
question is what should happen if DeZarn recognized the error, and
for the sake of obfuscating the facts, chose the 1991 date over the
name of the horse race to accomplish this goal. Perhaps it was right
to leave that decision to the jury. The rule of lenity tells us that
ambiguities in law are to be resolved in favor of the defendant. But
this, at least arguably, is not an ambiguity of law. Rather, it is a
murkiness in the facts regarding the defendant's state of mind.
Regardless, taken together, the cases describe a rather simple
story: If a person makes a statement under oath that she believes
to be false at the time she makes it, then that person has committed
perjury. Bronston tells us that a false statement must be literally
false-not a true statement that leads the hearer to infer something
false. DeZarn tells us that the "literal truth" defense is a misnomer.
More important than literal truth is the speaker's belief in the fal-
sity of her statement, which is exactly how the perjury statute is
worded.
Experimental work in the psychology of language suggests that
native speakers' intuitions about what constitutes a lie match the
holding of the DeZarn court. Most notably, linguists Linda Cole-
man and Paul Kay set out to determine how people understand the
concept of lying.43 Participants in a study were presented with vi-
gnettes that ended with a person making some kind of statement.
The participants were then asked to rate the statement on a 1-7
scale, where 1 indicated "very sure" it is not a lie, 2 and 3 were
"fairly sure" and "not too sure" it is not a lie, 4 was "can't say," and
5-7 went from "not too sure" it is a lie to "very sure" it is a lie.4 4
43. Linda Coleman & Paul Kay, Prototype Semantics: The English Word Lie, 57
LANGUAGE 26 (1981).
44. Id. at 30.
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The statements in the vignettes were varied systematically along
three axes. First, the statement was either true or false. Second,
the speaker either believed the statement to be true or believed it
to be false. Third, the speaker either intended to deceive the hearer
or not. These axes are the very features that Horn attributes to the
various definitions of lying, in addition to the requirement that a lie
be an assertion. 45
Coleman and Kay hypothesized that these three factors each con-
tributed to the meaning of the verb "to lie," but that none is a nec-
essary condition; some combination may be sufficient. They further
hypothesized that participants would rate the statements with ei-
ther all three or no elements to be the strongest, i.e., prototypical
examples of lying, with various combined features being less clear.
And that is just what happened.
First, consider the all-or-nothing vignettes. Vignette (I) has all
of the features of a prototypical lie, vignette (II) none of them:
(I) Moe has eaten the cake Juliette was intending to serve to
company. Juliette asks Moe, 'Did you eat the cake?' Moe says,
'No.' Did Moe lie?4 6
(II) Dick, John, and H.R. are playing golf. H.R. steps on Dick's
ball. When Dick arrives and sees his ball mashed into the turf,
he says, 'John, did you step on my ball?' John replies, 'No, H.R.
did it.' Did John lie?4 7
Both answers are self-serving, but only one is true and intended to
convey the truth. Sure enough, Coleman and Kay's subjects almost
universally thought confidently that (I) contains a lie (6.96 average)
and that (II) does not contain a like (1.06 average). 4 8
The more interesting cases are ones in which some, but not all, of
the three elements of lying are present. What do people think when
a person makes a truthful statement, knowing it to be true, but with
the intention of attempting to get the hearer to draw a false infer-
ence? This is the typical scenario of fraud without lying, discussed
earlier. Below is the scenario that contains these conditions:
(VI) John and Mary have recently started going together. Val-
entino is Mary's ex-boyfriend. One evening John asks Mary,
45. See Horn, supra note 16, at 25.
46. Coleman & Kay, supra note 43, at 31.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 33.
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'Have you seen Valentino this week?' Mary answers, 'Valen-
tino's been sick with mononucleosis for the past two weeks.'
Valentino has in fact been sick with mononucleosis for the past
two weeks, but it is also the case that Mary had a date with
Valentino the night before. Did Mary lie? 4 9
The mean score on this question was 3.48,50 close to the midpoint of
4.00. This suggests that, on the average, people did not consider
this to be a lie, but it approaches being a lie. I have presented this
scenario to law students who, when probed, typically agree with the
statement: "I don't think Mary lied, but what she did was dishonest,
and I'm uncomfortable saying it's not a lie because that answer
doesn't reflect my disapproval of her behavior."
In essence, this scenario is Bronston. Mary evaded answering the
question directly so that she would not have to tell the whole story
or take responsibility for having lied, neither of which was palatable
under the circumstances. It also resembles President Bill Clinton's
efforts to evade the truth without lying.5 1 Clinton had been sued by
Paula Jones, an employee of the state of Arkansas, for sexual har-
assment while Clinton was Governor of that state. Later, Kenneth
Starr, a special prosecutor appointed to investigate whether the
President or those close to him had committed any crimes in con-
nection with a real estate investment called Whitewater, convened
a grand jury to determine whether Clinton had perjured himself or
obstructed justice when he testified in a deposition in the Jones lit-
igation. Much of the questioning in the deposition was about his
sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky, which apparently
caught him off guard. Before the grand jury, he testified in true
Bronstonian fashion:
Q [W]as it your responsibility ... to answer those questions
truthfully, Mr. President?
49. Id. at 31.
50. Id. at 33.
51. For a fair account of the relevant facts, see generally RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR
OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON (2000).
Both Peter Tiersma and I wrote about linguistic issues concerning the Clinton impeachment
and the events leading up to it. See SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note 29, at 221-31; Lawrence
M. Solan, The Clinton Scandal: Some Legal Lessons from Linguistics, in LANGUAGE IN THE
LEGAL PROCESS 180-95 (Janet Cotterill ed., 2002); Peter Tiersma, Did Clinton Lie? Defining
Sexual Relations, 79 CHI-KENT L. REV. 927 (2004).
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A It was.... But it was not my responsibility, in the face of
their repeated illegal leaking, it was not my responsibility to
volunteer a lot of information. 52
The House of Representatives voted to bring Articles of Impeach-
ment against Clinton for lying to the grand jury but not for lying in
the Jones deposition. Both before the grand jury and at his deposi-
tion, Clinton refused to characterize his conduct with Lewinsky as
"having sexual relations" because in his dialect of English, the term
is only applicable if the relationship includes sexual intercourse. In
fact, it was not until his grand jury appearance that he admitted
having a physical relationship with Lewinsky at all. Testifying
about an affidavit that Lewinsky had sworn, Clinton said to the
grand jury: "I believe at the time that [Lewinsky] filled out this af-
fidavit, if she believed that the definition of sexual relationship was
two people having intercourse, then this is accurate. And I believe
that is the definition that most ordinary Americans would give it."53
To Clinton, intercourse is a necessary element of the concept "sex-
ual relations." Along these same lines, Clinton had famously told
the press: "I did not have sexual relations with that woman, Ms.
Lewinsky." 54 Whether he would agree that his own conduct may be
within that term but not its prototype for some people is something
we cannot know.
If the Mary vignette and Clinton's statements resemble
Bronston's approach to the truth, what do they say about DeZarn?
The following Coleman and Kay vignette describes a person who
thought he was lying but later found out that he had spoken truth-
fully:
Superfan has got tickets for the championship game and is very
proud of them. He shows them to his boss, who says, 'Listen,
Superfan, any day you don't come to work, you better have a
better excuse than that.' Superfan says, 'I will.' On the day of
the game, Superfan calls in and says, 'I can't come to work to-
day, Boss, because I'm sick.' Ironically, Superfan doesn't get to
52. THE STARR REPORT: THE EVIDENCE 361 (Phil Kuntz ed., 1998).
53. H.R. DOc. NO. 105-311, at 473 (1998) (deposition of William Jefferson Clinton in
Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark. 1998)).
54. See, e.g., jw00534, Bill Clinton--"I did not have sexual relations with that woman",
YOUTUBE (Apr. 18, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VBe-guezGGc.
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go to the game because the slight stomach ache he felt on aris-
ing turns out to be ptomaine poisoning. So Superfan was really
sick when he said he was. Did Superfan lie?55
Most people said he did. The mean score was 4.61,56 again fairly
close to the midpoint of 4 but nonetheless on the "lying" side of the
line.
Other findings were interesting as well. When a person makes a
false statement as a result of having mistaken the fact of the mat-
ter, participants did not call it a lie. But they did call it a lie when
the speaker made a true statement as a result of having mistaken
the facts in an effort to tell a lie. They also considered a polite state-
ment from a guest to a host after a dismal party to be a lie. These
results reinforce the intuitive appeal of the perjury law, which fo-
cuses on the belief of the speaker, rather than on the speaker's fac-
tual accuracy. It also gives some credence to both Bronston and
DeZarn as consistent with people's judgments about what consti-
tutes a lie and what does not.
Coleman and Kay's results indeed suggest that we are more com-
fortable calling some statements lies than others and that falsity is
not the determining factor-at least, not by itself. Rather, in keep-
ing with the earlier work of Eleonor Rosch,5 7 we are more comfort-
able categorizing prototypical cases as members of a category than
we are categorizing fringe cases as members of a category. Work by
British psychologist James Hampton and his colleagues confirms
that consensus about category membership dissipates as we stray
from the prototype.5 8 This explains why the scores get closer to the
midpoint when some, but not all, of the features of a prototypical lie
are present. Steven Winter develops the case for this approach im-
pressively in his book A Clearing in the Forest.59 However, it should
be kept in mind that the means reported by Coleman and Kay are
only partly informative. If half the participants are certain that a
statement is a lie, the other half certain that it is not, the mean on
a 1-to-7 scale would be exactly 4-the midpoint-even though there
is no uncertainty about category membership, only sharp disagree-
ment.
55. Coleman & Kay, supra note 43, at 31-32.
56. Id. at 33.
57. Eleanor Rosch, Cognitive Representations of Semantic Categories, 104 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 192, 197-99, 229-33 tbl.Al (1975).
58. James A. Hampton, Zachary Estes & Sabrina Simmons, Metamorphosis: Essence,
Appearance, and Behavior in the Categorization of Natural Kinds, 35 MEMORY & COGNITION
1785, 1797-98 (2007).
59. See generally STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LIFE, LAW, AND MIND
(2001).
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Also to be kept in mind are the findings of Lila Gleitman and her
colleagues. A study by Sharon Armstrong, Lila Gleitman, and
Henry Gleitman found that while words indeed have prototypes,
people use them more to sort out good and bad examples of a con-
cept than they do in deciding category membership in the first
place.60 For example, people agree that a robin is a better example
of a bird than a penguin. However, when asked, they also say that
a penguin is no less a bird than a robin. Regardless, with the law's
concern about "ordinary meaning" in legal interpretation, it seems
clear that prototype analysis has a place in legal argumentation.
C. Section 1001: Lying to a Government Official
Perjury is not the only crime that requires proof of a lie. It is also
a crime to lie to a government official in the context of an official
interaction even when not under oath. Section 1001 of the U.S.
Criminal Code reads in relevant part:
§ 1001. Statements or entries generally
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in
any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative,
or judicial branch of the Government of the United States,
knowingly and willfully-
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or
device a material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent
statement or representation; or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing
the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or
fraudulent statement or entry;
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5
years[.]61
The law does not apply to false statements made by parties or
their lawyers in judicial proceedings. 62 Those are covered by the
60. Sharon Lee Armstrong, Lila R. Gleitman & Henry Gleitman, What Some Concepts
Might Not Be, 13 COGNITION 263, 267 (1983) (describing view of categories that considers
"[m]embership in the class [as] categorical, for all who partake of the right properties are in
virtue of that equally birds; and all who do not, are not").
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2016).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2016).
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perjury and obstruction of justice laws and by procedural rules that
sanction parties who act dishonestly.
As this essay is being written, Section 1001 has come into play in
American culture. Two members of President Trump's inner circle
have pleaded guilty to violating this statute. On December 1, 2017,
former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn pleaded guilty to
lying to the FBI about contacts he had with a former Russian am-
bassador to the United States, Sergey Kislyak, in violation of Sec-
tion 1001.63 The charges to which he pleaded guilty alleged that he
falsely told the FBI that he did not ask the Russian Ambassador "to
refrain from escalating the situation in response to sanctions that
the United States had imposed against Russia"; that he did not re-
member being told that Russia agreed to moderate its response as
a result of Flynn's request; that Flynn did not ask the Russian Am-
bassador to act with respect to a then pending UN Security Council
resolution; and that the Russian Ambassador never conveyed to
Flynn Russia's response to this request. 6 4 He has not yet been sen-
tenced as of this writing. The agreement requires Flynn's cooper-
ating with Special Counsel Robert Mueller in the investigation into
Russian meddling in the 2016 presidential election. 65
About six weeks earlier, George Papadopoulos, who served as a
foreign policy advisor to Donald Trump during his campaign, also
pleaded guilty to violating Section 1001 by lying to the FBI about
his interactions with individuals connected to the Russian govern-
ment. He told the FBI that his contacts with these individuals were
superficial and occurred before he joined the campaign; in fact, the
contacts were serious efforts to work with the Russian individuals
and occurred during his tenure with the Trump campaign. 6 6
This law has been the source of another interesting interpretive
issue: The "exculpatory no" defense. As noted, Section 1001 does
not apply to statements made in judicial proceedings. This, of
course, includes pleading "not guilty" to a crime that the defendant
actually committed. What, if instead, a suspect tells a federal law
63. The documents are available at Matthew Kahn, Michael Flynn Plea Agreement Doc-
uments, LAWFARE (Dec. 1, 2017, 9:44 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/michael-flynn-plea-
agreement-documents.
64. Statement of the Offense at 2-4, United States v. Michael T. Flynn, available at
https://www.lawfareblog.com/michael-flynn-plea-agreement-documents.
65. Letter from Special Counsel's Office to Michael Flynn and his counsel dated Novem-
ber 30, 2017 at 5-6, available at https://www.lawfareblog.com/michael-flynn-plea-agreement-
documents.
66. Statement of the Offense at 2-3, United States v. George Papadopoulous, available
at Vanessa Sauter, George Papadopoulos Stipulation and Plea Agreement, LAWFARE (Oct. 30,
2017, 10:25 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/george-papadopoulos-stipulation-and-plea-
agreement.
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enforcement officer that he did not engage in conduct that is crimi-
nal in nature? Is such a denial a federal crime? Until 1998, many
circuit courts accepted the "exculpatory no" defense, saying that a
simple denial of an accusation of criminal activity comes within a
suspect's constitutional rights.67 But that year, the Supreme Court
put this practice to an end in Brogan v. United States.68
James Brogan was a union leader who had illegally taken money
on five occasions from a business that employed union members.
The statute of limitations had run on four of the five. 69 One night,
federal agents knocked on Brogan's door and asked him whether he
had accepted such funds. He answered "no" and was subsequently
prosecuted for the false statement. Such a denial comes very close
to simply saying, "I plead not guilty." Had Brogan said that, instead
of "no," Justice Ginsburg observed in her concurring opinion,70 he
would not have been prosecuted. Secondly, in cases like Brogan's,
applying the statute to a situation in which the government already
knows the truth, including situations in which the statute of limi-
tations has already run, applying Section 1001 is an open invitation
to law enforcement agents to create crimes when none that could be
prosecuted has been committed.71
Yet the language of Section 1001 makes no exception for exculpa-
tory "no" cases, and the majority, in an opinion written by Justice
Scalia, decided to follow the text as written. This drew sharp criti-
cism from Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion, for courts routinely
contextualize statutes to avoid having them apply to situations that
were not intended to be covered.72
In some respects, Brogan's denial and the denials of members of
the Trump campaign share a common narrative. All of these indi-
viduals, when approached by law enforcement officers, could have
asserted their rights under the Fifth Amendment and not answered
the questions. The biggest difference is that Brogan was caught by
surprise in the night, whereas the Trump affiliates met with agents
voluntarily and lied to them, perhaps assuming wrongly that there
would be no independent record of what really happened. It is also
67. Moser v. United States, 18 F.3d 469, 473-474 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Taylor,
907 F.2d 801, 805 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d 1222, 1224 (9th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179, 183 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Tabor,
788 F.2d 714, 717-719 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Fitzgibbon, 619 F.2d 874, 880-881
(10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 183-184 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 935 (1976).
68. 522 U.S. 398 (1998).
69. Id. at 411 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 412 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 419-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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possible that President Trump's affiliates did not commit a crime
by meeting with the Russian representatives, and lied merely to
protect the false story coming from the White House that there were
no such contacts-criminal or not. Whatever their motives, it is
hard to believe that people involved in a heavily-reported investi-
gation of that sort were unaware that there may be consequences if
they are caught lying to the FBI. This puts Brogan in a somewhat
more sympathetic light; he may well have simply been pleading not
guilty in his own way but failed to use the acceptable language to
do so.
We are thus left with four observations when it comes to how the
law treats lies: First, making a truthful statement that is intended
to lead the recipient to believing something false is not a lie, at least
as far as the perjury statute is concerned (Bronston). Second, mak-
ing an assertion one believes to be false is a lie, even if the assertion
turns out to be true (DeZarn). Third, bald-face lies are still lies,
even if they do not fool anyone and were not intended to fool anyone
(Sorensen and examples of students lying to escape serious punish-
ment). Fourth, pleading "not guilty" in court is not a lie, but saying
"I didn't do it" to the police is a lie (Brogan). Philosophers are not
in complete accord in drawing boundaries around the concept of ly-
ing. 73 Yet the illustrations in the literature suggest that the legal
definition is in accord with the conclusions of many scholars who
have taken positions on the definition of lying.
III. DECEIT
A. Lying Versus Deception: Which is Worse?
Samuel Bronston was not a perjurer, but that does not make him
a paragon of virtue. His goal was to trick his creditors into thinking
that he did not have assets that he actually did have to prevent
those assets being distributed among them by the Bankruptcy
Court. Bronston engaged in an act of deception that apparently was
thwarted as a result of the assets in question having been discov-
ered independently.
People generally consider lying to be morally worse than deceiv-
ing by misdirection. Philosopher Jennifer Mather Saul presents the
following experiment to demonstrate the point:
73. For example, Jorg Meibauer, takes the position that the deceit in cases like Bronston
should be seen as falling within an extended definition of lying. See Jorg Meibauer, Lying
and Falsely Implicating, 37 J. PRAGMATICS 1373, 1382 (2005).
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An elderly woman is dying. She asks if her son is well. You saw
him yesterday (at which point he was happy and healthy), but
you know that shortly after your meeting he was hit by a truck
and killed. [Is it better] to utter (1) than (2)-because (1) is
merely misleading while (2) is a lie[?]
(1) I saw him yesterday and he was happy and healthy.
(2) He's happy and healthy. 74
Many people choose (1) over (2) because telling the truth is morally
better than lying, even if the truth is intentionally misleading. But
Saul argues that it should make "no defensible moral preference"
for deception through misdirection over lying.75 The result is the
same. To Saul, the difficult issue is why so many of us feel better
about ourselves uttering (1) rather than (2) if there is no moral basis
for preferring one over the other.
Others take the view that uttering a false statement is itself a
moral wrong, which should be taken seriously in its own right.
Seana Valentine Shiffrin presents strong argumentation in this di-
rection, 76 using Kant's "murderer at the door" as a vehicle for anal-
ysis. 77
B. What the Law Says About Deceit
At this point, one may wonder why the legal system would create
a safe harbor for fraudulent conduct in the courtroom whereas it is
outlawed in everyday life. If anything, one might expect judicial
proceedings to be a sanctuary for honesty and fair play. Stuart
Green explains the disparity this way:
Why exactly should culpable deceit be easier to prove in cases
of fraud than of perjury? The distinct contexts in which the two
crimes are committed suggest a possible answer: As noted
above, perjury involves statements made under oath, often in
a formal, adversarial setting where the truth of the witness'
statement can be tested through probing cross-examination.
Fraud, by contrast, typically occurs in a commercial or regula-
tory setting, where the deceiver and deceived are engaged in
74. SAUL, supra note 23, at 70.
75. Id. at 86.
76. SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY, AND THE LAW
5-46 (2014).
77. Immanuel Kant, On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives (1799),
https://www.unc.edu/courses/2009spring/plcy/240/001/Kant.pdf.
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an arm's length, often one-shot transaction. In such circum-
stances, there is no opportunity for careful fact-finding or cross-
examination. Likely for this reason, the courts have tended to
define deception more broadly in the fraud context than in that
of perjury.78
Green's explanation is consistent with that of the Bronston Court,
which blamed the creditors' lawyer for not following up and asking
the question that would have pinned Bronston down ("What about
you personally?"). 7 9 Indeed, the adversarial system does present
the opportunity to probe further. But that does not really get to the
heart of the matter. For one thing, in the world of business, at least
in many transactional environments, both parties have ample op-
portunity to ask additional questions to undo the inferences drawn
from misleading statements. While we may not wish to require
those in the business world to be as distrustful as those in the world
of adversarial litigation, the distinction between the two settings
may not be adequate to justify such a sharp distinction in moral
responsibility.
Deception, like lying, is generally disallowed in the business
world, especially when a victim relies on a deceptive statement to
his or her detriment. That is the classic definition of fraud. There
are nuances, however. When it comes to misrepresentations for
which there are monetary or criminal sanctions, the conveyor's
state of mind comes more into play. Consider Rule 10b-5 of the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or
of the mails or of any facility of any national securities ex-
change,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
78. Green, supra note 4, at 7-8.
79. 409 U.S. at 358.
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(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.8 0
Note that the rule specifically includes truthful statements that are
designed to lead the reader or hearer to draw a false inference. This
is exactly what Bronston did. It is not perjury, but it is an act of
fraud. By the same token, the definition of fraud itself explains why
puffery is accepted in commercial transactions. An individual is
defrauded only after he reasonably relies to his detriment on a false
or misleading statement. Statements on which it is not reasonable
to rely because they are simply normal boasts that the recipient
should know to discount as such are not fraudulent under that
standard.
In our book Speaking of Crime,81 Peter Tiersma and I agree with
the holdings in both Bronston and DeZarn but find the justification
not in the lawyer's responsibility to follow up as a matter of profes-
sional competence, but, rather, in the role morality of lawyers.
Lawyers are permitted to deceive in circumscribed ways, which are
defining features of the relationship between lawyer and adverse
witness. To take two examples, lawyers are permitted, some say
required, to produce false defenses. By "false defense" I mean a
defense based on legitimate evidence that is likely to lead a trier of
fact to an inference that the lawyer knows to be false. This license
applies particularly to criminal defense lawyers. A lawyer who de-
cides not to challenge the time of death in an autopsy report that
contains errors in calculation would be remiss even if the lawyer
knew from his own client that the estimated time of death is fairly
accurate. Likewise, as Monroe Freedman has pointed out, a lawyer
who fails to cross-examine a visually-impaired eyewitness on what
she actually saw because he knows her account to have been accu-
rate would be committing malpractice.8 2
Moreover, in the routine cross-examination of witnesses, it is the
lawyer's job to persuade witnesses to agree to characterizations of
uncontested events in ways that will help the lawyer's client. Wit-
nesses need not agree to inaccurate characterizations, of course, but
even such choices as "smash" versus "hit" in a car accident case can
80. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2018) (emphasis added).
81. SOLAN & TIERSAMA, supra note 29, at 234-35.
82. MONROE FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 48 (1975).
Vol. 5696
Lies, Deceit, and Bullshit
have a profound effect on how a juror conceptualizes the event. 83
The moral issue arises when the lawyer knows that the characteri-
zation is sufficiently accurate so that the witness has an obligation
to accept it, but that is not a fair characterization. That is, if the
lawyer was speaking in casual conversation with a person she
trusts, she would have used different language.
As Bradley Wendel points out in his essay in this volume, 84 it is
not enough to justify deceptive practices by lawyers as within the
role of the lawyer in society unless we can justify the rules of the
role itself on independent moral grounds. He writes:
We tolerate lawyers engaging in these practices not because we
are indifferent to lying, but because we recognize that bluffing
in negotiations and arguing for false inferences are means to
broader institutional ends such as protecting liberty and ena-
bling citizens to have access to the rights allocated to them by
law. The assessment of public actors as truthful or untruthful
requires situating their conduct in context, including the ex-
pectations and beliefs of others who participate in the relevant
social practices and institutions. This contextual, community-
grounded evaluation also suggests that we may do better at re-
alizing the value of truthfulness by instituting and reinforcing
certain methodologies and practices that are adapted to the ob-
stacles one is likely to encounter to the maintenance of truth.85
Returning to Bronston, a witness does not answer questions in a
vacuum. A witness answers questions that are often designed to
elicit answers that will create a misimpression, at least from the
witness's point of view. At the very least, the questions are in-
tended to elicit answers that will serve the interest of the party the
lawyer represents, even if neither the lawyer nor the witness would
regard the exchange as producing a fair characterization from the
perspective of a neutral observer.
This license for lawyers to produce a record that may go beyond
the lopsided, even to the point of being deceptive, helps explain why
Bronston should not go to prison for playing on the same field.
Grice's Cooperative Principle tells us that in ordinary conversation,
we assume the other participant to be moving the discussion along
83. Elizabeth F. Loftus & John C. Palmer, Reconstruction ofAutomobile Destruction: An
Example of the Interaction Between Language and Memory, 13 J. VERBAL LEARNING &
VERBAL BEHAVIOR 585 (1974).
84. W. Bradley Wendel, Truthfulness as an Ethical Form of Life, 56 DUQ. L. REV. 141
(2018).
85. Id. at 154-55.
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in a cooperative manner, and we give the other individual the im-
pression that we are doing the same.86
In cross-examination, some of this cooperation holds. For exam-
ple, Grice's maxim of relation (be relevant) is required of witnesses,
although Bronston himself trickily flouted that maxim. Yet trial
practice manuals encourage lawyers to be conversational in their
cross-examination not to cooperate with the witness, but to lull the
witness into being less guarded and more cooperative-increasing
the likelihood of getting helpful responses.87
IV. BULLSHIT
As noted at the beginning of this article, bullshit may be either
true or false: The bullshitter does not care which.88 But the bull-
shitter does care about something. What the bullshitter cares about
is winning an argument, by whatever rhetorical means is neces-
sary. As the philosopher Jason Stanley describes, the same holds
true for the propagandist. 89 Propaganda, according to Stanley, need
not be false, but rather must be a statement, whether true or false,
made in the service of promoting a flawed ideology. 90 Thus, while
not all bullshit is propaganda in that it is not made in the service of
a flawed political ideology, it is plausible to claim that all propa-
ganda is bullshit, in that the truth of the matter is subordinate to
accomplishing an illegitimate (at least in a liberal democracy) goal.
Let us look first at the use of bullshit in current political discourse,
and then turn to how the law deals with bullshit.
A. A Brief Note on President Trump
On December 30, 2017, the Washington Post published an article
titled, "In a 30-minute interview, President Trump made 24 false or
misleading claims." 91 President Trump had been interviewed by
the New York Times at one of his golf resorts and was apparently
not entirely truthful in his remarks. I will not summarize the de-
tails of the interview here because this essay is focused on the legal
86. Grice, supra note 30, at 45.
87. See STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY: ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE 87 (3d ed.
2013); THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES AND TRIALS 207 (9th ed. 2013).
88. FRANKFURT, supra note 8, at 55.
89. See generally JASON STANLEY, How PROPAGANDA WORKS (2015).
90. Id. at 46.
91. Glenn Kessler, In a 30-Minute Interview, President Trump Made 24 False or Mislead-
ing Claims, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.msn.comlen-us/news/factchecklin-a-30-
minute-interview-president-trump-made-24-false-or-misleading-claims/ar-
BBHulgy?i=BBmkt5R&ocid=spartandhp.
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system's handling of the various species of dishonesty. However,
whether it is Bill Clinton talking about his sex life, George W. Bush
talking about Iraq's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, or Tony
Blair's similar efforts, politicians are known to present information
in a manner that is more concerned with the narrative they wish to
create than with the truth of the matter. President Trump holds a
special place in this succession. In the summer of 2017, the New
York Times published a full-page list of what it called "Trump's
Lies," updated later to include dates through November 11.92 Below
are two examples:
FEB. 18: "You look at what's happening in Germany, you look
at what's happening last night in Sweden. Sweden, who would
believe this?" (Trump implied there was a terror attack in Swe-
den, but there was no such attack.)93
MARCH 17: "I was in Tennessee - I was just telling the folks
- and half of the state has no insurance company, and the
other half is going to lose the insurance company." (There's at
least one insurer in every Tennessee county.) 9 4
In response to claims that Trump was no different from President
Obama, the Times further reported a comparative analysis showing
that Trump had produced more false statements in ten months than
Obama had in his entire eight years in office. 95
How many of President Trump's inaccurate statements are lies,
how many are honest mistakes, and how many are bullshit is any-
one's guess. Continuing to adopt Frankfurt's definition, "bullshit"
is an assertion made without regard for whether the assertion is
true or not. For the bullshitter, whether a statement is true or false
is a matter of convenience. When the statement happens to be true,
there will be less criticism and, accordingly, less inconvenience.
92. David Leonhardt & Stuart A. Thompson, Trump's Lies, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.ny-
times.com/interactive/2017/06/23/opinion/trumps-lies.html?_r=O.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. David Leonhardt, lan Prasad Philbrick & Stuart A. Thompson, Trump's Lies us.
Obama's, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/14/opin-
ion/sunday/trump-lies-obama-who-is-worse.html. The analysis, which claimed to use the
same method to evaluate the truth of statements by both presidents that had been challenged
as inaccurate, found that Trump had made 108 false statements in ten months in office,
whereas Obama had made eighteen in his eight years in office.
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Whether bullshit is morally more blameworthy than lying or de-
ceiving, as Frankfurt argues, is subject to debate, at least as a psy-
chological matter. Daniel Effron, a social psychologist on the fac-
ulty of London Business School, has explored the circumstances un-
der which people forgive false statements, at least to some extent. 96
He found that when people are presented with a plausible counter-
factual statement, suggesting how a change in circumstances may
have resulted in the false statement being true, they judge the false
statement as less unethical. Consider this example, taken from Ef-
fron:
"It's a proven fact that Donald Trump won the electoral vote,
but lost the popular vote to Hillary Clinton." Yet, a person
falsely states: "Trump won the popular vote." Half the subjects
also received this counterfactual passage: "Trump did not cam-
paign for the popular vote, because the law says that the win-
ner of the electoral vote wins the presidency. Consider the fol-
lowing thought: If Trump had tried to win the popular vote,
then he would have won the popular vote."97
In one of the studies, the other half of the subjects were presented
with the vignette without the counterfactual statement quoted
above, but instead with a passage that also contains an if-then
statement that had nothing to do with Trump's not having won the
popular vote: "Senator Mitch McConnell is a Republican from Ken-
tucky. He is currently the Senate Majority Leader. Consider the fol-
lowing thought: If Mitch McConnell runs for President in 2020, then
he will win the popular vote." 98
Effron found that when presented with a statement that provides
a plausible alternative state of affairs in which the false statement
could have actually been a true statement, people found the false
statement less ethically objectionable and the person who uttered
it less immoral for having done so.99 Moreover, half of the scenar-
ios contained false statements that aligned with the political pref-
erences of Trump supporters, and the other half contained false
statements that aligned with the preferences of Clinton support-
ers.100 The studies showed that when the false statement aligned
96. Daniel A. Effron, It Could Have Been True: How Counterfactual Thoughts Reduce
Condemnation of Falsehoods and Increase Political Polarization, 44 PERSONALITY AND
SOCIAL PSYCHOL. BULL. 729 (2018).
97. Id. at 732 (emphasis in original)..
98. Id.
99. Id. at 736-37.
100. Id. at 732.
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with the participant's preferences, the participant condemned the
falsehoods significantly less harshly than when the false statement
was not aligned with their own views.10 1
What is more, when asked to create their own counterfactuals by
imagining a scenario in which the false statement became a true
statement, subjects' own imagined alternative scenario led them to
judge the original falsehood less harshly.102 To the extent that we
do this in everyday life, it begins to explain our willingness to for-
give false statements made by those with whom we agree.
Effron's study does not directly answer Frankfurt. The pass we
give to bullshitters with whom we agree as long as we can imagine
what they said is true may well be a moral blind spot rather than
evidence that such behavior is less objectionable upon reflection. It
does explain, however, how it is that Trump's supporters do not be-
come enraged when he falsely claimed that people living in portions
of Tennessee had no health insurers, when in fact they did.
B. How the Law Reacts to Bullshit
Bullshit does not meet the criteria for either lying or deceiving
because the requisite state of mind is absent. The person who nei-
ther knows nor cares about the truth cannot tell a lie. Moreover,
bullshit may be the result of wishful thinking. People may have a
general sense of a situation and fill in the details without adequate
evidence. The law is not consistent in its treatment of bullshit, but
it is specifically disapproved in particular contexts.
1. Federal Pleadings
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that all
court filings be signed and that the signature is a certification of
various representations, including:
(b) Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court a
pleading, written motion, or other paper-whether by signing,
filing, submitting, or later advocating it-an attorney or unrep-
resented party certifies that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances: . ..
101. Id at 741-42.
102. Id. at 738.
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(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary sup-
port after a reasonable opportunity for further investiga-
tion or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the
evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably
based on belief or a lack of information. 103
This rule removes from lawyers (and pro se litigants) the right to
make claims in court based on the hope that the evidence will later
support the claim, unless it is specifically stated that the filer lacks
evidence at the time to support the claim. In other words, it se-
verely limits bullshit.
Added to this rule are cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court
requiring detailed, factually-based pleadings in civil litigation. In
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,10 4 decided in 2009, the Supreme Court set stand-
ards for a court's decision on whether to grant a motion to dismiss
a complaint for failure to state a claim. Restating the test it had
established in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,10 5 the Court held
that:
[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief sur-
vives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint
states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals
observed, be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing
court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. ...
In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion
to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that,
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to
the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide
the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by fac-
tual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allega-
tions, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.10 6
Taken together, these cases require those who file civil cases in fed-
eral court have significant knowledge of facts, which are sometimes
not in their control. When one adds to the pleading requirements
the certifications under Rule 11, the likelihood of bullshit in federal
103. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
104. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
105. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
106. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (citations omitted).
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pleadings has surely been reduced. I take no position here on con-
cerns expressed that these cases have the effect of closing the court
house door on many meritorious claims that require discovery to be
adequately developed to meet the pleading standards.
2. Expanded Definition of Fraud
Recall that fraud requires an effort to lead someone to believe
something that the speaker believes to be false. Yet some statutes,
and many statements of the common law, include "reckless disre-
gard for the truth" as a substitute for knowingly making a false
statement.107 This standard requires somewhat more regard for the
truth than does Frankfurt's bullshit because the truth must be
fairly overt for it to be recklessly disregarded. Nonetheless, the fact
that an individual can commit fraud without knowing the truth and
flouting it is a significant step away from classic definitions of de-
ceit.
By the same token, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts makes
a contract voidable for misrepresentation when the aggrieved party
relies on a representation that is either fraudulent or material (or
both).108 And a fraudulent misrepresentation includes bullshit:
(1) A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker intends his
assertion to induce a party to manifest his assent and the
maker
(a) knows or believes that the assertion is not in accord
with the facts, or
(b) does not have the confidence that he states or implies
in the truth of the assertion, or
(c) knows that he does not have the basis that he states or
implies for the assertion.109
The broad definition of fraudulent misrepresentation makes sense
in this context, where the remedy is rescission of a contract. If a
person enters into an agreement because the other party misin-
formed her, that party should not be bound as long as the misinfor-
mation was of a material fact, regardless of the state of mind of the
purveyor of falsity.
107. See, e.g., Pace v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273, 274-75 (Utah 1952).
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) (AM. LAW. INST. 1981).
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162(1) (AM. LAW. INST. 1981).
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V. CONCLUSION
This essay has attempted to demonstrate differential tolerance
for various forms of dishonest conduct in legal contexts. Lying is
never allowed as a formal matter, but it is tolerated in courtrooms
when offered by law enforcement agents. Deception short of lying
is permitted by witnesses in court but not by people engaged in com-
mercial life. Bullshit, the bread and butter of political life, is out-
lawed as a species of fraud in some circumstances, tolerated in oth-
ers. When we add to this set of facts the materiality requirement
in both perjury and fraud cases, the law appears to recognize the
fact that people do not always tell the truth-but it ensures that the
legal system operates with sufficient integrity such that dishonesty
does not compromise the integrity of business interactions or the
truth-seeking function of the courtroom.
